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THE FCC'S RESTRICTIONS ON
EMPLOYEES' PUBLICATIONS: A
FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION?
MICHAEL BOTEIN*

INTRODUCTION
The Communications Act of 1934 provides that the Federal
Communications Commission may not censor its licensees, 1 and
the Commission often has repeated its hesitancy to pass judgment on program content.2 Courts and commentators also have
addressed themselves frequently to fIrst amendment limitations
on the Commission's powers? Ironically enough, however,
there is little concern with the Commission's internal censorship-its restrictions on its own employees' rights to publish.
The hard truth of the matter is simply that the Commission
exercises total censorship over its employees' publications. The
Commission thus prevents its employees from publishing scholarly-as opposed to sensational-articles in professional journals.
Section 19.735-203(c) of the Commission's Rules4 requires on

* B.A., Wesleyan University, 1966; J.D., Cornell University, 1969;
LL.M., Columbia University, 1972. Mr. Botein is a former senior attorney
advisor, Cable Television Bureau, Federal Communications Commission.
147 U.S.C. § 326 (1972) provides that:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
2See, e.g., Hon. Harley O. Staggers, 30 FCC 2d 150 (1971), in which
the Commission refused to review the accuracy of the controversial
"Selling of the Pentagon" program.
3See, e.g., Jaffe, Program Control, 14 Vill. L. Rev. 619 (1969); Note,
Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 701 (1964);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
447 C.F.R. § 19.735-203(c) (1974) provides that:
Employees of the Commission are encouraged to engage in teaching,
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its face only that "articles written by the staff shall not identify
the author with the Commission or the federal government
unless prior approval has been obtained" from the Executive
Director, the Chairman, or an individual Commissioner, depending upon the status of the employee. In theory, the rule
thus appears to require clearance only if a Commission employee wishes to have an article reflect his status at the Conunission. In practice, however, the Commission has given the rule a
radically different interpretation. The Commission interprets
the rule as requiring clearance of any publication which either
identifies the author with the Commission or deals with communications law. Moreover, an employee's chance of securing
clearance is virtually nil. In addition to denying. permission
outright, the Commission often delays a decision indefinitelylecturing, and writing that is not prohibited by law, the Executive Order,
the Civil Service Regulations, or this chapter. However, an employee of the
Commission shall not, either with or without compensation engage in
teaching, lecturing, or writing, including teaching, lecturing, or writing for
the purpose of the special preparation of a person or class of persons for
an examination of the Civil Service Commission or Board of Examiners for
the Foreign Service, that is dependent on information obtained as a result
of his Government employment, except when that information has been
made available to the general public or will be made available on request,
or when the Chairman gives written authorization for the use of nonpublic
information on the basis that the use is in the public interest. Articles
written by the staff shall not identify the author with the Commission or
the Federal government unless prior approval has been obtained: In the
case of employees generally, from the Executive Director upon the
recommendation of the appropriate Bureau Chief; in the case of Heads of
Offices and Bureaus, from the Chairman; and in the case of an employee in
the immediate office of a Commissioner, from the individual Commissioner. Nor shall documents prepared in the course of official duties be
used for private gain by any Commission employee. In addition, the
Commissioners shall not receive compensation or anything of monetary
value for any consultation, lecture, discussion, writing, or appearance the
subject matter of which is devoted substantially to the responsibilities,
programs, or operations of the Commission, or which draws substantially
on official data or ideas which have not become part of the body of public
information.
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thus killing the relevance of any publication which deals with an
even vaguely topical subject.
It is difficult to estimate the subjects on which Commission
employees might be interested in publishing, for the simple
reason that employees never have been free to publish. Legal
personnel, however, presumably might wish to write about the
Commission's powers and responsibilities under the Communications Act of 1934, the Administrative Procedure Act, and
various judicial doctrines. Similarly, engineers or economists
might be interested in contributing to the numerous trade
journals in their fields; indeed, a short mathematical equation or
general theory often must hit print immediately, in order to be
of any value to the public. In any event, it probably is safe to
say that a Commission employee would have little interest in a
shocking revelation or an expose.
A Commission employee dare not treat the rule lightly,
since a violation quite literally puts his or her job on the line.
Other portions of the Commission's Rules provide that an
employee's violation Of any internal Commission rule may lead
to reprimand, suspension, or removal. 5 Accordingly, the mere
existence of the rule has a chilling effect on any employee's
desire to publish.
This combination of the rule's interpretation and the Commission's refusal to grant permission is simply that Commission
employees are barred from publishing on the subjects about
which they know the most. An employee presumably derives
little consolation from the fact that he or she is perfectly free to
547 C.F.R. § 19.735-l07(a)(c)(v) (1974). Indeed, there may be some
question as to whether removal of an employee for violating the rule is
even within the Commission's statutory powers. The general provision
governing discharge of federal employees, 5 U.S.C. § 750l(a) (1972)
requires a rmding of "cause," and publication of nonconfidential
information might very well be held not to constitute such. As noted later,
at 244 infra, the Supreme Court recently has supplied this statute with a
more definite gloss. Arnett v. Kennedy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4513, 4520-21 (April
16,1974).
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write about the Rule in Shelley's Case or the holder in due
course doctrine.
The Commission's interpretation and enforcement of the
rule thus constitute bad and basically unreasoned policy; as will
be noted,6 there appears to be little justification for the Commission's position. In addition, the COmmlssion's application of
the rule represents a very tangible inhibition on the first amendment rights of Commission employees. The rule thus is probably unconstitutional as well as unwise. Accordingly, the Commission should repeal the portion of the rule which requires
prior clearance of articles.
LACK OF JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RULE
Attempting to discern the goal of the anti-publication rule
is somewhat arduous, for the simple reason that the Commission never has bothered to defme or explain the rule publicly.
Accordingly, the only alternative is to make some hopefully
educated guesses as to the possible justifications for the rule.
There are five possible goals, none of which seems to justify the
rule.
First, the Commission might be concerned with preventing
the disclosure of confidential or classified information. But
while this may be a constitutionally valid goal, 7 the anti-publication rule is a highly questionable means of reaching it. Confidential information leaks out of the Commission in a steady
stream, as perusal of any trade magazine indicates. 8 In addition,
federal statutes make the release of confidential information
not only a federal crime, but also grounds for dismissal. 9
Accordingly, the Commission has little need to prevent the
publication of potentially confidential material, since it can
take either disciplinary or criminal action after the fact.
6 See

pp. 234-237 infra.
pp. 244-245 infra.
8 Ironically enough, many Commission employees discover the contents
of closed agenda meetings from trade magazines.
918 U.S.C. § § 789,1905 (1972); 50 U.S.C. § 783 (1972).
7 See
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A second possible justification for the rule might be to
prevent the public from confusing private staff opinions with
public Commission policies. This rationale seems somewhat
questionable, however, in light of the fact that Commission
employees are perfectly free to-and often do-giYe advisory
opinions to the public.! 0 Since Commission employees' personal opinions are in continuous circulation, it actually would
be preferable for employees to reduce them to print-a medium
which is available to all and which can be challenged readily.
Moreover, Commissioners may publish to their hearts' content;!! many have done so. A Commissioner's statement presumably carries much more weight with the public than an
employee's, even though one Commissioner cannot bind the
agency. Accordingly, it is somewhat anomalous to invoke the
rule against Commission employees, but not against Commissioners.
Third, the rule might be designed to prevent the Commission from embarassment through publication of nonconfidential
but unfavorable information-such as that uncovered by various
! 0 A somewhat bizarre variation on this theme occurs when an
organization makes a transcript of an employee's speech and then publishes
it without his consent. In this case, the employee clearly is identified with
the Commission and comments on matters before the Commission;
nevertheless, the Commission obviously is powerless to enforce its internal
personnel regulations against a third party. Even more convoluted conduct
occurs if the publishing organization is conscientious enough to ask the
employee's permission to publish his or her remarks; in that situation, the
employee presumably must make a request for permission from the
Commission, even though the employee did not initiate the publication.
!! The rule does not run against Commissioners for the simple reason
that they are not employees of the Commission, but rather are
accountable only to the executive and legislative branches. Congress could
impose a similar anti-publication requirement upon Commissioners if it
chose to, however, and its failure even to consider the issue indicates that
it does not find that publication by Commissioners constitutes a threat to
any national interest. Administrative law judges also are exempt from the
rule. since the Administrative Procedure Act prevents an agency from
exerting any control over their activities. 5 U.S.C. § 5335(a) (1972).
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"Nader's Raiders" groups. 1 2 As noted before, however, the
internal workings of the Commission are commonly known to
at least the communications bar; accordingly, it does little real
good to prevent an employee from publishing that a particular
Commissioner seems to have a particular constituency. More
importantly, Commission employees embarrass the Commission
more severely by conduct than by publication; an inept handling of a regulatory issue or a public exhibition of drunkenness
certainly hurts the Commission far more than an article criticizing the Commission's regulatory policies. This type of conduct, however, obviously is not subject to prior clearance.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, prevention of embarassment is a rather tenuous interest at best; as will be noted laterl 3
the courts have accorded it virtually no weight.
A fourth basis for the rule might be to prevent criticism of
the Commission by its own employees. This justification is
somewhat questionable at best, however, for several reasons.
The Commission already is on the receiving end of brickbats of
every size, shape, and variety. Courts, congressional committ.ees,
and s;ommentators generally comment about the Commission in
highly critical terms. 1 4 Accordingly, potentially increased criticism by Commission employees would be comparatively small.
And ironically enough, the antipublication rule prevents Commission personnel from replying to criticism of the Commission.
For example, a recent article by former Commissioner Nicholas
Johnson 15 levied scores of criticisms against the Commission,
which many employees thought were unfounded. The anti-publication rule prevented an employee from responding to John12 For an example of this type of revelation, see R. Fellmeth, The
Interstate Commerce Omission (1970).
13 See pp. 242. infra.
14 See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F. 2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); B. Schwartz, The Professor and the
.
Commissions (1959).
15 Johnson & Dystal, A Day in the Life: The Federal Communications
Commission, 82 Yale L.J. 1575 (1973).
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son, however, and thus deprived the Commission of a potentially spirited and effective defense. Finally, immunity from
criticism has no higher social value than prevention of embarassment.
The fifth and fmal possible justification for the rule might
be to prevent Commission employees from abusing their status
at the Commission to get their writings published. This rationale
proceeds from the assumption that editors will accord deference
to Commission employees, on the theory that their writings are
particularly interesting, accurate, or meritorious. This possibility seems, however, comparatively remote. Most editors are
not likely to be cowed by the fact that a writer works for the
Commission, since legal publishers deal with high-powered lawyers on a daily basis. Moreover, it is somewhat unrealistic to
assume that an author's position is never relevant to his or her
ability to get published. It is a common-albeit perhaps unjustfact of life that a Harvard University law professor generally
receives more invitations to publish than a Podunk University
law professor.
Accordingly, none of the possible justifications for the
anti-publication rule appears to hold much water. Conversely,
however, allowing Commission employees to publish freely may
have a number of positive effects.
First, many Commission employees have good ideas about
regulatory policy, but simply lack a forum in which to express
them. As in any other bureaucracy, the Commission's hierarchial structure carefully filters the information which highlevel personnel receive.! 6 Accordingly, a Commission employee
often lacks any real forum in' which to present potentially
useful ideas. Removing the constraints on publication thus
would allow employees to present their ideas both within and
without the Commission.
!6For an excellent general discussion of the,means by which an agency
controls the internal flow of information, see A. Downs, Inside
Bureaucracy (I966).
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Second, Commission employees often know more about a
particular area of Commission policy than practitioners or
commentators. Unlike "general" communications practitioners,
Commission employees usually specialize in a comparatively
narrow area at any given time. For example, most members vf
the communications bar deal with a mix of broadcasting, safety
and special services, and cable television; a Commission employee is unlikely, however, to work in more than one of these
areas at the same time. Accordingly, a Commission employee
brings to his or her writing a greater understanding.
Third, Commission employees have far less of an economic
dis-incentive against publishing than practitioners. Since Commission employees are not remunerated on a per-hour basis,
they can afford more easily to devote their leisure time to
writing. Accordingly, abolition of the anti-publication rule
would increase significantly the amount of writing-and thus
hopefully the amount of discussion-on issues of concern to the
Commission.
Finally, the rule's muzzling effect makes many Commission
employees feel like second-class citizens, in relation to their
brethren at the private bar. Allowing Commission employees to
publish thus not only would increase their morale, but also
would place them in a better position vis-a-vis the private bar.
Accordingly, abolition of the anti-publication rule would
have a number of highly desirable results. It would add significant and knowledgeable content to discussions of regulatory
policy. Moreover, abolition of the rule would redound ultimately to the Commission's benefit, by improving the morale of
its employees.
To be sure, total freedom to publish carries with it the
potential risk of releasing confidential or classified information.
As noted before, however,! 7 the Commission already has perfectly adequate disciplinary and criminal remedies for such
situations. Indeed, if a Commission employee is intelligent
17 Supra

at 234.
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enough to write a publishable article, it seems unlikely that he
or she would be stupid enough to use confidential or classified
informa tion.
The practices of other federal agencies merely reinforce
this conclusion. Some agencies simply appear to have no restrictions at all, while others have very limited bans. Indeed, a
number of agencies have rules which use the same language as
the first two sentences in the Commission's rule, but which
omit any ban on publication or any requirement of clearance. 1 8
Since other agencies have made the considered judgment that
they can do business on this basis, there seems to be little basis
in fact for believing that the Commission can not.
The Commission's anti-publication rule thus represents an
unwise-albeit largely inadvertent-policy choice. Moreover, and
perhaps more important, it is a substantial inhibition on Commission employees' rust amendment rights
VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
,
Government employees today can blame much of the
courts' initial hesitancy to recognize their rust amendment
rights on Mr. Justice Holmes. While still sitting on the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Holmes handed down one of
his equisitely drafted opinions, holding that a city could discharge an employee who spoke on political issues. In the course
of his opinion, Holmes gratuitously made an observation which
remained viable until all too recently:
The plaintiff may have a constitutional right to talk polities, but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman. 19
18See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 0.735-40(d) (1971) (Atomic Energy
Commission); 18 C.F.R. § 3.735-5(2) (1974) (Federal Power Commission); 29 C.F.R. § 1600.735-203(b) (1974) (Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission).
19McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
John J. McAuliffe was an ordinary policeman who violated a department
rule by helping his party to bring the vote in. The whole lawsuit appears to
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Until the second half of the twentieth century, the rule in
McAuliffe's case was alive and well. To be sure, the Supreme
Court had held as early as 1926 that the government could not
exact unconstitutional conditions-the famous "rock and whirlpool" imagery of Mr. Justice Sutherland.2° Nevertheless, it
did not quickly apply this reasoning to public employees' fIrst
amendment rights; indeed, for a,long time th€' Court's test of an
unconstitutional condition was whether the condition was reasonably related to the governmental privilege granted.21
The tone of this argument was set in United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 2 2 where the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Hatch Act's ban on all political activities by ·federal employees. Writing for a bare plurality of four, Mr. Justice Reed
spoke only in terms of the government's need for political
purity in its workers; he never even raised the issue of an
employee's interest in maintaining his or her job. In several
early loyalty cath cases, the Court thus used similar reasoning
to uphold statutes which conditioned public employment upon
execution of non-communist oaths and affIdavits.23 At the
same time, however, the Court began to accept the notion of at
least some vested interest in public employment. It thus noted
that:
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protec·
have been basically just a local political squabble between rival factions.
Unfortunately, however, the report of the case reveals the party affiliation
of neither McAuliffe nor his superiors.
20 Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926). The court
went on to note that "the power of the state is not unlimited; and one of
the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the
relinquishment of constitutional rights." ld. at 593-94.
21 See, e.g., Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional
Rights, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 321,325 (1935); Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595,
1597 (1960).
22330 U.S. 75 (1947).
23See, e.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951);
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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tion does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to
stlltute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.24

The Court took a major step toward changing this view of
government employees in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 25 The
court there invalidated the same loyalty oath statute which a
decade before it had upheld. 2 6 More importantly, however, the
Court noted that it had modified its conception of a government employee's interest in his or her job.
The Couit thus recognized that potential deprivation of a
job was as serious a sanction as a potential civil or criminal
proceeding. Accordingly, an agency cannot do indirectly by
dismissal what it cannot do drrectly by prosecution. To be sure,
different classes of federal employees have different expectancies concerning job security; a quasi-political Schedule C appointee does not envision tenure and knows that he or she can
be frred by the agency at will. Nevertheless, dismissal represents
a very real hardship for any class of employee; indeed, the
Court has not drawn frrst amendment lines on the basis of an
employee's status.2 7
Accordingly, the Court has taken an increasingly dim view
24Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 185 (1952)., The Court later picked
up this more or less offhand comment and used it as the basis for
invalidating a number of other indirect inhibitions on Irrst amendment
rights. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); (conditioning of
state tax benefits on non-communist oath); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (I961) (legislative investigations of alleged communists).
25
385 U.S. 589 (1966).
26 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). While the Adler
case had upheld the statute on its face, the Keyishian Court found that the
interaction of numerous and complex statutes made the whole scheme
void for vagueness. If the Court had considered the issue on a totally fresh
basis, it thus presumably would have held flatly that the statute violated
the First Amendment.
27 And even more recently, the Court has applied rigorous procedural
due process requirements to the dismissal of even non-tenured personnel.
Compare Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) with Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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of any inhibitions on the fIrst amendment rights of government
employees. The Commission's anti-publication rule thus runs
afoul of the First Amendment for a number of reasons-its
chilling effect on employees' speech, its operation as a prior
restraint, and its discriminatory application.
Chilling Effect
The Supreme Court laid McAuliffe to a long overdue and
well deserved rest in Pickering v. Board of Education 2 8. The
Court there held that a school board could not fIre a teacher
because he had criticized the school's management in a letter to
a local newspaper. Indeed, Pickering represented a far more
aggravated situation than that at which the Commission's antiPQblication rule is aimed; the Court there found that several of
the statements in the teacher's letter were defamatory.2 9
Although the Court held that it would not be "feasible to
attempt to lay down a general standard ... ," 3° it made quite
clear that it viewed any muzzling of government employees
with extreme suspicion. It thus rejected out of hand the school
board's argument that it had some vague interest in restricting
its employees' public statements. A governmental entity, the
Court stated, had no particular immunity from criticism. 3 1
Indeed, the Court noted that the operation of public schools
was a matter of "legitimate public concern"32 and that government employees often were the best critics of government:
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to
have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the
operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential
28
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
291d. at 572-73. Moreover, the plaintiffs letter in Pickering was highly
critical. It noted that "this shows their stop at 'nothing' attitude ..." and
pointed up "the kind of totalitarianism teachers live in at the high school,

and your children go to school."
30ld. at 569.
31!d. at 571.
321d.
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that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear
of retaliatory disrnissa1.33

In fact, the Court indicated that an agency was justified in
dismissing an employee for a public statement only if it created
a very serious and tangible discipline problem within the government34 -a condition which is likely to be rare. 3 5
Pickering's reasoning should apply with even greater force
to the Commission's anti-publication rule, which penalizes employees not for making defamatory public statements, but
rather for making any public statements at all. The Commission
certainly can not claim any greater immunity from criticism
than a school board; indeed, it should be more open to criticism, because of its greater public interest responsibilities. Similarly, Commission actions are matters of "legitimate public
concern" almost by definition, since the agency is under a
statutory mandate to enforce the "public interest, convenience,
any necessity."3 6 And just as teachers are the best critics of
school boards, Commission employees may be the best critics of
the Commission-without using any classified or confidential
information. As noted before,37 Commission employees have
an almost unique ability to develop expertise in specialized
areas and to transfer that expertise into useful publications.
To be sure, the scope and vitality of Pickering may be
33 ld. at 572.
341d. at 570.
35 One

lower federal court found that a government employee's public
statements were sufficiently serious to create a discipline problem. Moore
v. Board of Education, 452 F. 2d 726 (5thCir.1971). Most other federal
courts have looked at such governmental claims, however, somewhat
suspiciously. See, e.g., Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F. 2d 475 (7th Cir.
1972); Commonwealth ex. reI. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center,
356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
36
47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1972). Thus a school board arguably might
concern itself only with a limited constituency-e.g., school-age childrenwhile the Commission must consider the whole panoply of differing and
often conflicting public interests.
37Supra at 238.
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marginally suspect. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 38 the Court upheld
the dismissal of an OEO employee who had accused a higher
official of misusing government funds. But though the result in
Arnett certainly was diametrically opposed to that in Pickering,
the reasoning was not. The only fIrst amendment issue before
the court was the constitutionality of the statute which authorized plaintiffs discharge; and the plurality held only that the
statute was not void for vagueness. Indeed, the plurality cited
Pickering only once,39 and did not discuss the case at all. The
Court's very inability to muster a majority as well as the cloudy
nature of the plurality opinion thus make the case almost
useless as precedent.
Moreover, the Court has gone to great lengths in protecting
government employees' rights to criticize their subordinates. In
Barr v. Matteo, 4 0 the Court held that former employees could
not recover damages in a libel action against their former
supervisor, who had issued a defamatory press release concerning them. In thus conferring an absolute privilege upon government officials, the Court reasoned that employees needed to
pursue their notions of the public interest freely. The court
noted that:
It has been thought important that officials of government should be

free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage
suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties-suits which
wOllld consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted
to governmental services and the threat of which might appreciably
inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies
of government.41

To be sure, the Court did not extend the principle to all
government employees at all levels; indeed, it indicated that the
privilege might attach only to employees with policy-making
38 42 U.S.L.W. 4513 (April 16, 1974). The case definitely had some
strange overtones to it, since the plaintiff's statement was that his
supervisor had offered $100,000 to a local agency to sign a statement
accusing the plaintiff of wrong-doing.
39 ld. at 4522.
40 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
41 ld. at 571.
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functions. At the same time, however, the Court made clear
that though the scope of the privilege might vary from official
to official, almost any professional. employee would receiv~
some protection.42 Moreover, the Court later extended the
principle to a Navy captain,43 and the lower federal courts have
applied the Barr doctrine to comparatively low-level employees.44
The converse of the Barr principle is that government
employees should be free to criticize their employers. Indeed, it
would be somewhat anomalous to permit agency employees to
defame their subordinates, and yet not allow a right of reply.4 5
Moreover, Barr establishes the principle that government employees should be free to speak out on issues which they
consider important to the public.
Finally, at least one court has shown a willingness to curtail
agency censorship of employees' publications. In United States
v. Marchetti,46 the Fourth Circuit enjoined a former employee
of the Central Intelligence Agency from publishing a book
which discussed his experiences with the CIA, on the ground
that he had signed a valid agreement to clear all publications
with the agency. The court was careful to restrict the grounds
of its decision, however, to situations involving classified information and national security. The court thus refused to enforce
the contract "to the extent that it purports to prevent unclassified information, for, to that extent, the oath would be in
contravention of his [the plaintiff's] First Amendment
rightS.,,47 Moreover, in considering the specific deletions which
421d. at 573-74.
43 Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
44For an excellent discussion of these cases, see W. Gellhorn & C. Byse,
Cases and Materials on Administrative Law 309-314 (5th Ed. 1970).
45 Indeed, the Commission's own fairness doctrine and regulations
create a right of reply. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1974).
46 466 F. 2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 1063 (1973).
471d. at 1317 (footnote omitted). Ironically enough, the CIA's action
backfired, by giving the book tremendous free publicity. In its ultimately
censored form, it sold quite well. This type of backlash thus indicates that
agencies profit little from playing the role of censor.
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the CIA had made, the District Court later rejected several
hundred of them-thus indicating that its view of classified
information was rather different from the CIA's.411
The Commission's anti-publication rule thus seems to fly in
the face of the First Amendment, to the extent that it constitutes a flat ban on publication by employees. The rule represents a type of thinking which may have had some validity fIfty
years ago, but which now has lost its vitality.
Prior Restraint
Although censorship was a common and accepted practice
during colonial days, in recent times the Court has condemned
prior restraints in all but the most compelling situations.49
Moreover, the Court has been particularly chary about "administrative restraints"50 and about censors with too much discretion.51 In addition, the Court has recognized that informal
pressure may constitute a very tangible prior restraint52 and
that threats can be as inhibiting as action. 53
The Commission's anti-publication rule thus does not seem
to fall within the narrow scope of allowable prior restraints.
Enforcement of the rule obviously involves "administrative
restraints," since it rests in the hands of administrative offIcials.
Moreover, calling the rule vague goes far by way of understate48 Alfred B. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, (Civ. No. 540-73-A, B.D. Va., 1974).
And even more recently, the Third Circuit held that a housing authority
could not discipline employees for taking public positions on a referendum
which the agency was conducting. Aldermen v. Philadelphia Housing
Authority,42 U.S.L.W. 2574 (3rd Cir., April 16,.1974).
49Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Court indicated that it
would uphold prior restraints only to prevent publication of obscenity or
interference with the national security.
50 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) struck down a
Rhode Island .statutory scheme whereby state officials would "advise"
book dealers that sale of a particular book might lead to criminal liability.
51 In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) the Court
found that a statutory standard of "sacreligious" was too vague.
52Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
53Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
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ment; as noted before,s4 on its face the rule prohibits only
identification of an author as a Commission employee. Finally,
the rule represents a very tangible threat to every Commission
employee, since a violation can lead to dismissal.
Moreover, even if the substance of the rule met the Court's
increasingly stringent standards, the enforcement procedure
would not. In the extremely narrow range of permissible prior
restraints, the Court has conditioned the use of prior restraints
upon a high degree of procedural due process. In Freedman v.
Maryland,S 5 the Court thus struck down a Maryland statue
which provided for prior adminstrative review of motion pictures. Although the Court previously had recognized obscenity
as one of the few areas in which a prior restraint was appropriate,S 6 it held that the Maryland statutory scheme failed to
provide adequate procedural due process. The Court thus held
that any form of prior restraint had to place the burden of
proof upon the censor and provide for speedy judicial review of
the censor's decision.s 7
The Commission's anti-publication rule fails to meet either
test. Neither the rule nor its interpretation places the burden of
proof upon the Commission. And the Commission is under no
duty at all to secure a speedy judicial determination as to the
validity of its restraint. Indeed, it is somewhat questionable as
to whether an employee could secure judicial review at all, since
the Commission's failure to grant permission hardly represents a
final order-let alone any order at all.
The anti-publication rule thus violates the First Amendat 232-233.
55380 U.S. 51 (1965).
56 Supra note 49.
s7The Court thus noted that:
First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression
must rest on the censor.... Second ... only a proceeding requiring a
judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint .... To this
end, the exliibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial
construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either
issue a license or go to court to restrain showing of the rum. 380 U.S. at
58-59.
54 Supra
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ment's ban on prior restraints both substantively and procedurally. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Commission could
draft any rule which would meet the Court's restrictions.
Discrimination
The Supreme Court consistently has held under both the
. First and Fourteenth Amendments that a government may not
discriminate in granting fIrst amendment rights. 5 II The rule
discriminates quite overtly, however, by allowing only selected
Commission personnel to publish. Thus a Commissioner or
administrative law judge is perfectly free to publish, while a
staff employee is totally barred. As noted before, 5 9 there are
perfectly valid legal reasons for exempting these two groups
from the rule. In practical terms, however, a Commissioner or a
judge carries much more weight with the public and thus has a
much greater ability to bring about the very evils at which the
rule appears to be directed. 60
Accordingly, the Commission has chosen the wrong way of
remedying its legal inability to prohibit publication by Commissioners and judges. Instead of promulgating a discriminatory
rule, it simply should have adopted no rule at all.
Private Law Analogy
Although labor unions generally are not subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment, both state courts and Congress61 have
imposed limitations on unions' power to expel members for
criticizing either offIcials or policy. The cases in this area often
involved conduct which went beyond the boundaries of criticism; the courts frequently were reviewing a bitter internal
58 See, e.g., Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) and Public
Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904), where the Court held that
the Post Office could not deny mailing privileges to disapproved literature.
59 Supra note 11. As indicated there, both Commissioners and judges
have statutory independence from the Commission's rules.
60Por an analysis of the supposed evils, see pp. 234-237, supra.
61 29 U.S.C. § 4il(a)(2) (1972).
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power struggle-a situation not likely to arise from Commission
employee's publishing an article.
The courts have justified their intervention in this area on a
number of bases. Very often they have invalidated explusions
from unions under the guise of a failure of procedural due
process or through an overly narrow construction of the union's
constitution. 62 A few courts have invoked the free speech
guarantees of their state constitutions,63 and one based its
decision on the federal Constitution without explaining how
state action was present. 64 A New York and a California court
came to exactly the same conclusion, however, merely on the
grounds of public policy. 65
The case for government employees should be even more
compelling that that for union members. On the one hand,
explusion from a union does not constitute deprivation of a
livelihood; indeed, a member may well not lose his or her job,
unless he or she works in a closed shop.6 6 On the other hand, a
union needs discipline more than a government agency; the
union must present a unified front in a bargaining situ'ation,
while an agency requires only enough unity to preserve efficiency. Accordingly, it is somewhat ironic that Commission
employees receive more limited fIrst amendment rights than
union members.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's anti-publication rule thus represents an
attempt to reach rather questionable ends through even more
62Summers, Legal Limitation on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1049 (1951); Summers, The Law of Union Discipline, 70 Yale L. J. 175,
193-94 (1960).
63 Harrison v. Brotherhood of Railway and SS. Clerks, 271 S.W. 2d 852
(Ct. App. Ky., 1954); Spayd v. Running Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67,112 A.
70 (1921).
64 Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252,103 N.E. 2d 769 (1951).
65 Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y. 2d 283,174 N.Y.S. 2d 653, 151 N.E.2d
73 (1958); Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813
(Dist Ct. App. 1961).
66 Summers, The Law of Union Discipline, 70 Yale L. J. 175, 179
(1960).

250

I

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS BAR JOURNAL

questionable means; as noted before,67 it is almost impossible
to ascertain the purpose of the rule, let alone its meaning.
Moreover, the rule infringes on Commission employees' fIrst
amendment rights to a degree which a court probably would
not tolerate.
Accordingly, the Commission simply should repeal the
clearance requirement of the rule. To be sure, a total lack of
any procedure might redound to Commission employees' detriment, by encouraging their superiors to exercise covert "lifted
eyebrow" regulation. This type of suppression is just as possible
under the existing rule, however, and few Commission employees are intellectually dishonest enough to suppress their
inferiors' dissident viewpoints.
In the past, the Commission has gone to great lengths to
protect the first amendment rights of its licensees and the
public. It now should do the same for its own personnel.
67 Supra

at 234.

